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Abstract
Reading comprehension models often overfit
to nuances of training datasets and fail at ad-
versarial evaluation. Training with adversar-
ially augmented dataset improves robustness
against those adversarial attacks but hurts gen-
eralization of the models. In this work, we
present several effective adversaries and auto-
mated data augmentation policy search meth-
ods with the goal of making reading com-
prehension models more robust to adversarial
evaluation, but also improving generalization
to the source domain as well as new domains
and languages. We first propose three new
methods for generating QA adversaries, that
introduce multiple points of confusion within
the context, show dependence on insertion lo-
cation of the distractor, and reveal the com-
pounding effect of mixing adversarial strate-
gies with syntactic and semantic paraphras-
ing methods. Next, we find that augmenting
the training datasets with uniformly sampled
adversaries improves robustness to the adver-
sarial attacks but leads to decline in perfor-
mance on the original unaugmented dataset.
We address this issue via RL and more efficient
Bayesian policy search methods for automat-
ically learning the best augmentation policy
combinations of the transformation probability
for each adversary in a large search space. Us-
ing these learned policies, we show that adver-
sarial training can lead to significant improve-
ments in in-domain, out-of-domain, and cross-
lingual (German, Russian, Turkish) generaliza-
tion without any use of training data from the
target domain or language.1
1 Introduction
There has been growing interest in understanding
NLP systems and exposing their vulnerabilities
through maliciously designed inputs (Iyyer et al.,
1We will publicly release all our code, adversarial policy
data, and models on our webpage.
2018; Belinkov and Bisk, 2018; Nie et al., 2019;
Gurevych and Miyao, 2018). Adversarial exam-
ples are generated using search (Alzantot et al.,
2018), heuristics (Jia and Liang, 2017) or gradient
(Ebrahimi et al., 2018) based techniques to fool
the model into giving the wrong outputs. Often,
the model is further trained on those adversarial
examples to make it robust to similar attacks. In
the domain of reading comprehension (RC), adver-
saries are QA samples with distractor sentences
that have significant overlap with the question and
are randomly inserted into the context. By having a
fixed template for creating the distractors and train-
ing on them, the model identifies learnable biases
and overfits to the template instead of being robust
to the attack itself (Jia and Liang, 2017). Hence,
we first build on Wang and Bansal (2018)’s work
of adding randomness to the template and signifi-
cantly expand the pool of distractor candidates by
introducing multiple points of confusion within the
context, adding dependence on insertion location
of the distractor, and further combining distractors
with syntactic and semantic paraphrases to create
combinatorially adversarial examples that stress-
test the model’s language understanding capabili-
ties. These adversaries inflict up to 45% drop in per-
formance of reading comprehension models built
on top of large pretrained models like RoBERTa
(Liu et al., 2019).
Next, to improve robustness to the aforemen-
tioned adversaries, we finetune the reading compre-
hension model with a combined augmented dataset
containing an equal number of samples from all of
the adversarial transformations. While it improves
robustness by a significant margin, it leads to de-
cline in performance on the original unaugmented
dataset. Hence, instead of uniformly sampling from
the various adversarial transformations, we propose
to perform a search for the best adversarial policy
combinations that improves robustness against the
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adversarial attacks and also preserves/improves ac-
curacy on the original dataset via data augmenta-
tion. However, it is slow, expensive and inductive-
biased to manually tune the transformation proba-
bility for each adversary and repeat the process for
each target dataset, and so we present several RL
and Bayesian search methods to learn this policy
combination automatically.
For this, we create a large augmentation search
space of up to 106, with four adversarial methods,
two paraphrasing methods and a discrete binning
of probability space for each method (see Figure
1). Cubuk et al. (2019a) showed via AutoAug-
ment that a RNN controller can be trained using
reinforcement learning to efficiently find the best
policy in a large search space. However, AutoAug-
ment is computationally expensive and relies on
the assumption that the policy searched using re-
wards from a smaller model and reduced dataset
will generalize to bigger models. Alternatively,
the augmentation methods can be modelled with
a surrogate function, such as Gaussian processes
(Rasmussen, 2003), and subjected to Bayesian opti-
mization (Snoek et al., 2012), drastically reducing
the number of training samples required for achiev-
ing similar results (available as a software package
for computer vision).2 Hence, we extend these
ideas to NLP and perform a systematic compari-
son between AutoAugment and our more efficient
BayesAugment version.
Finally, there has been limited previous work ex-
ploring the role of adversarial data augmentation to
improve generalization of reading comprehension
models to out-of-domain and cross-lingual data.
Hence, we also perform automated policy search
of adversarial transformation combinations for en-
hancing generalization from English Wikipedia to
datasets in other domains (news) and languages
(Russian, German, Turkish). We show that augmen-
tation policies for the source domain learned using
target domain performance as reward, improves the
model’s generalization to the target domain without
using any training data from that domain. Similarly,
we use adversarial examples in a pivot language
(in our case, English) to improve performance on
other languages’ RC datasets without using any
data from that language for training.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We first propose novel adversaries for reading
comprehension that cause up to 45% drop in
2https://pypi.org/project/deepaugment/
large pretrained models’ performance. Augment-
ing the training datasets with uniformly sampled
adversaries improves robustness to the adversar-
ial attacks but leads to decline in performance
on the original unaugmented dataset.
• We next demonstrate that optimal adversarial
policy combinations of transformation probabil-
ities (for augmentation and generalization) can
be automatically learned using different policy
search methods. Our experiments also show that
efficient Bayesian optimization achieves similar
results as AutoAugment with a fraction of the
resources.
• By training on the augmented data generated
via the learned adversarial policies, we not only
improve adversarial robustness of the models
but also show significant gains i.e., up to 2.07%,
4.0%, and 2.08% improvement for in-domain,
out-of-domain, and cross-lingual evaluation re-
spectively.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Methods in NLP: Following the in-
troduction of adversarial evaluation for reading
comprehension models by Jia and Liang (2017),
there has been extensive work on developing meth-
ods for probing the sensitivity and stability of
various NLP models (Nie et al., 2019; Glockner
et al., 2018). Wang and Bansal (2018) modified
the AddSent algorithm (Jia and Liang, 2017) to
increase variance in adversarial data and improve
robustness of BiDAF to adversarial attacks (Seo
et al., 2017). Zhao et al. (2018) employ GANS to
generate semantically meaningful adversaries for
machine translation and textual entailment. With
a similar goal, Ren et al. (2019) and Alzantot et al.
(2018) use a synonym-substitution strategy to pre-
serve the semantics and syntax of the original text
in its adversarial counterpart; the latter also use
population-based optimization to generate more
effective adversaries. Miyato et al. (2017) create
adversarial examples by adding noise to word em-
beddings. Using a white-box approach, Ebrahimi
et al. (2018) showed that gradient-based perturba-
tions can be used to trick a character-level neural
classifier. While most methods attack the semantics
of a sentence, Iyyer et al. (2018) construct a syntac-
tic paraphrasing network to introduce robustness to
syntactic variance in sentiment analysis models.
Augmentation and Generalization: Some
Adversary Method Description Original Question/Sentence and Corresponding Distractor
AddSentDiverse (Jia and Liang, 2017; Wang
and Bansal, 2018)
Q: In what country is Normandy located?
D: D-Day is located in the country of Sri Lanka.
AddKSentDiverse Multiple AddSentDiverse
distractors are inserted ran-
domly in the context.
Q: Which county is developing its business center?
D1: The county of Switzerland is developing its art periphery.
D2: The county of Switzerland is developing its home center.
AddAnswerPosition Answer span is preserved in
this distractor. It is most
misleading when inserted
before the original answer.
Q: What is the steam engine’s thermodynamic basis?
A: The Rankine cycle is the fundamental thermodynamic underpin-
ning of the steam engine.
D: Rankine cycle is the air engine’s thermodynamic basis.
InvalidateAnswer AddSentDiverse and addi-
tional elimination of the
original answer.
Q: Where has the official home of the Scottish Parliament been since
2004?
D: Since October 2002, the unofficial abroad of the Welsh Assembly
has been a old Welsh Assembly Houses, in the Golden Gate Bridge
area of Glasgow.
PerturbAnswer Content words (except
named entities) are algo-
rithmically replaced with
synonyms and evaluated for
consistency using language
model.
A: The UK refused to sign the Social Charter and was exempt from
the legislation covering Social Charter issues unless it agreed to be
bound by the legislation.
P: The UK repudiated to signature the Social Charter and was ex-
empt from the legislation encompassing Social Charter issues unless
it consented to be related by the legislation.
PerturbQuestion Syntacting paraphrasing net-
work is used to generate the
source question with a dif-
ferent syntax.
Q: In what country is Normandy located?
P: Where does Normany exist?
Table 1: Demonstration of the various adversary functions used in our experiments (Q=Question, D=Distractor,
A=Answer, P=Paraphrase). Words that have been modified using adversarial methods are italicized in the distractor.
works in computer vision use adversarial training to
demonstrate improvement for small datasets in the
fully-supervised setting (Goodfellow et al., 2015)
or larger datasets in the semi-supervised setting
(Miyato et al., 2018). More recently, Xie et al.
(2020) use an enhanced adversarial training scheme
with auxiliary batch normalization modules to im-
prove image recognition using adversarial exam-
ples. The most effective augmentation techniques
for RC have been back-translation and pre-training
with other QA datasets (Yu et al., 2018; Devlin
et al., 2019; Lewis et al., 2019a). Virtual adver-
sarial training (Miyato et al., 2017) also shows
improvements on some RC datasets (Yang et al.,
2019). Talmor and Berant (2019) show that finetun-
ing a pre-trained RC model with the target domain
improves generalization. Cao et al. (2020) propose
a conditional adversarial self-training method to
reduce domain distribution discrepancy. Lee et al.
(2019); Wang et al. (2019) use a discriminator to en-
force domain-invariant representation learning and
improve generalization to out-of-domain datasets
(Fisch et al., 2019). Similar attempts were made to
learn language-invariant representations for cross-
lingual text classification (Chen et al., 2018) and
lexicon induction (Zhang et al., 2017). We show
that heuristics-based adversaries can be leveraged
as augmentation as well as generalization data.
Policy Search: The AutoAugment algorithm
(Cubuk et al., 2019a) uses reinforcement learning
to effectively explore a large search space and find
the best augmentation policies for a downstream
task. Niu and Bansal (2019) use AutoAugment to
discover perturbation policies for dialogue genera-
tion. Ho et al. (2019) use population-based augmen-
tation (PBA) techniques (Jaderberg et al., 2017)
and significantly reduce the compute time required
by AutoAugment algorithm. In a follow-up work,
Cubuk et al. (2019b) present RandAugment that
reduces the task to simple grid-search by retaining
only global parameters. We are the first to adapt
RandAugment style techniques for NLP via our
BayesAugment method. RandAugment enforces
uniform transformation probability on all augmen-
tation methods and collapses the augmentation pol-
icy search space to two global parameters while
BayesAugment eliminates the need to choose be-
tween adversarial methods and optimizes only for
their transformation probabilities (see Sec. 3.3 for
more details).
3 Adversary Policy Design
As shown by Jia and Liang (2017), QA models are
susceptible to random, semantically meaningless
and even minor changes in the data distribution.
We extend this work and propose adversaries that
exploit the model’s sensitivity to insert location
of distractor, number of distractors, combinatorial
adversaries etc. After exposing the model’s weak-
nesses, we strengthen them by training on these
adversaries and show that the model’s robustness
to adversarial attacks significantly increases due to
it. Finally, in Sec. 4, we automatically learn the
right combination of transformation probability for
each adversary in response to a target improvement
using policy search methods.
3.1 Adversary Transformations
We present two types of adversaries, namely pos-
itive perturbations and negative perturbations (or
attacks) (Figure 1). Positive perturbations are ad-
versaries generated using methods that have been
traditionally used for data augmentation in NLP i.e.,
semantic and syntactic transformations. Negative
perturbations are adversaries based on the classic
AddSent model (Jia and Liang, 2017) that exploit
the RC model’s shallow language understanding to
mislead it to incorrect answers.
AddSentDiverse: We use the method outlined
by Wang and Bansal (2018) for AddSentDiverse
to generate a distractor sentence (see Table 1) and
insert it randomly within the context of a QA sam-
ple. In addition to WordNet, we use ConceptNet
(Speer et al., 2017) for a wider choice of antonyms
during generation of adversary. QA pairs that do
not have an answer within the given context are
also augmented with AddSentDiverse adversaries.
AddKSentDiverse: The AddSentDiverse
method is used to generate multiple distractor
sentences for a given context. Each of the dis-
tractor sentences is then inserted at independently
sampled random positions within the context. The
distractors may or may not be similar to each
other. Introducing multiple points of confusion is a
more effective technique for misleading the model
and reduces the scope of learnable biases during
adversarial training by adding variance.
AddAnswerPosition: The original answer span
is retained and placed within a distractor sentence
generated using a combination of AddSentDiverse
and random perturbations to maximize semantic
mismatch. We modify the evaluation script to com-
pare exact answer span locations in addition to
the answer phrase and fully penalize incorrect lo-
cations. For practical purposes, if the model pre-
dicts the answer span within adversarial sentence
as output, it does not make a difference. How-
ever, it brings into question the interpretability of
such models. This distractor is most effective when
placed right before the original answer sentence,
showing dependence on insert location of distrac-
tor.
InvalidateAnswer: The sentence containing
the original answer is removed from the con-
text. Instead, a distractor sentence generated using
AddSentDiverse is introduced to the context. This
method is used to augment the adversarial NoAn-
swer-style samples in SQuAD v2.0.
PerturbAnswer (Semantic Paraphrasing):
Following Alzantot et al. (2018), we perform se-
mantic paraphrasing of the sentence which contains
the answer span. Instead of using genetic algorithm,
we adapt their Perturb subroutine to generate
paraphrases and use the OpenAI-GPT (Radford
et al., 2018) model to rank them. See appendix for
details of this method.
PerturbQuestion (Syntactic Paraphrasing):
We use the syntactic paraphrase network introduced
by Iyyer et al. (2018) to generate syntactic adver-
saries. Sentences from the context of QA samples
tend to be long and have complicated syntax. The
corresponding syntactic paraphrases generated by
the paraphrasing network usually miss out on half
of the source sentence. Therefore, we choose to
perform paraphrasing on the questions. We gener-
ate 10 paraphrases for each question and rank them
based on cosine similarity, computed between the
mean of word embeddings (Pennington et al., 2014)
of source sentence and generated paraphrases (Niu
and Bansal, 2018; Liu et al., 2016).
Finally, we combine negative perturbations with
positive perturbations to create adversaries which
double-down on the model’s language understand-
ing capabilities. It always leads to a larger drop in
performance when tested on the reading compre-
hension models trained on original unaugmented
datasets.
3.2 Semantic Difference Check
To make sure that the distractor sentences are suf-
ficiently different from the original sentence, we
perform a semantic difference check in two steps:
1. Extract content phrases from original sentence.
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Figure 1: Flow chart of training loop for AutoAugment
controller and Bayesian optimizer. See Sec. 4 for de-
tails.
Content phrase is any common NER phrase or
one of the four: noun, verb, adverb, adjective.
2. There should be at least 2 content phrases in the
original text that aren’t found in the distractor.
We examined 100 randomly sampled original-
distractor sentence pairs and found that our seman-
tic difference check works for 96% of the cases.
3.3 Adversarial Policy & Search Space
Reading comprehension models are often trained
with adversarial samples in order to improve ro-
bustness to the corresponding adversarial attack.
We seek to find the best combination of adversaries
for data augmentation that also preserves/improves
accuracy on source domain and improves general-
ization to a different domain or language. Follow-
ing previous work in AutoAugment policy search
(Cubuk et al., 2019a; Niu and Bansal, 2019), we
define a sub-policy to be a set of adversarial trans-
formations which are applied to a QA sample to
generate an adversarial sample. We show that ad-
versaries are most effective when positive and neg-
ative perturbations are applied together (Table 2).
Hence, to prepare one sub-policy, we select one of
the four negative perturbations (or none), combine
it with one of the two positive perturbations (or
none) and assign the combination a transformation
probability (see Figure 1). The probability space
[0, 1] is discretized into 6 equally spaced bins. This
leads to a search space of 5∗3∗6 = 90 for a single
sub-policy. Next, we define a complete adversarial
policy as a set of n sub-policies with a search space
of 90n. For each input QA sample, one of the sub-
policies is randomly sampled and applied (with a
probability equal to the transformation probability)
to generate the adversarial sample.
We adopt a simplified formulation of the policy
for our BayesAugment method, following Ho et al.
(2019) and RandAugment (Cubuk et al., 2019b).
Sampling of positive and negative adversaries is
eliminated and transformation probabilities of all
possible combinations of adversaries are optimized
over a continuous range [0, 1].3 Consequently, one
of these combinations is randomly sampled for
each input QA sample to generate adversaries.
4 Automatic Policy Search
Next, we need to perform search over the large
space of augmentation policies in order to find
the best policy for a desired outcome. Perform-
ing naive search (random or grid) or manually tun-
ing the transformation probabilities is slow, ex-
pensive and largely impractical due to resource
constraints. Hence, we compare two different ap-
proaches for learning the best augmentation policy
in fewer searches: AutoAugment and BayesAug-
ment. We follow the optimization procedure as
demonstrated in Figure 1. For t = 1, 2, ..., do:
• Sample the next policy pt (sample)
• Transform training data with pt and generate
augmented data (apply, transform)
• Train the downstream task model with aug-
mented data (train)
• Obtain score on validation dataset as reward rt
• Update Gaussian Process or RNN Controller
with rt (update)
4.1 AutoAugment
Our AutoAugment model (see Figure 1) consists
of a recurrent neural network-based controller and
a downstream task model. The controller has n
3RandAugment collapses a large parameter space by en-
forcing uniform probability on all transformations and op-
timizing for: (i) global distortion parameter, (ii) number of
transformations applied to each image. It uses hyperparameter
optimization and shows results with naive grid search due to
small search space. RandAugment is not directly applicable
to our setting because there is no notion of global distortion
for text. Hence, we borrow the idea of treating augmenta-
tion policy parameters as hyperparameters but use Bayesian
optimization for search.
output blocks for n sub-policies; each output block
generates distributions for the three components
of sub-policies i.e., neg, pos and probability. The
adversarial policy is generated by sampling from
these distributions and applied on input dataset
to create adversarial samples, which are added to
the original dataset to create an augmented dataset.
The downstream model is trained on the augmented
dataset till convergence and evaluated on a given
metric, which is then fed back to the controller as
a reward (see the update flow in figure). We use
REINFORCE (Sutton et al., 1999; Williams, 1992)
to train the controller.
4.2 BayesAugment
Typically, it takes thousands of steps to train an Au-
toAugment controller using reinforcement learning
which prohibits the use of large pretrained models
as task model in the training loop. For example, the
controllers in Cubuk et al. (2019a) were trained for
15,000 samples or more. To circumvent this com-
putational issue, we frame our adversarial policy
search as a hyperparameter optimization problem
and use Bayesian methods to perform the search.
Bayesian optimization techniques use a surrogate
model to approximate the objective function f and
an acquisition function to sample points from ar-
eas where improvement over current result is most
likely. The prior belief about f is updated with sam-
ples drawn from f in order to get a better estimate
of the posterior that approximates f . Bayesian
methods attempt to find global maximum in the
minimum number of steps.
We use Gaussian Process (GP) (Rasmussen,
2003) as surrogate function and Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) (Srinivas et al., 2010) as the acquisi-
tion function. GP is a non-parametric model that is
fully characterized by a mean function µ0 : χ 7→ IR
and a positive-definite kernel or covariance func-
tion k : χ × χ 7→ IR. Let x1, x2, ...xn denote
any finite collections of n points, where each xi
represents a choice of sampling probabilities for
each of the augmentation methods and fi = f(xi)
is the (unknown) function value evaluated at xi.
Let y1, y2, ...yn be the corresponding noisy obser-
vations (the validation performance at the end of
training). In the context of GP Regression (GPR),
f = f1, .....fn are assumed to be jointly Gaussian.
Then, the noisy observations y = y1, ....yn are nor-
mally distributed around f as y|f ∼ N (f, σ2I).
The Gaussian Process upper confidence bound (GP-
UCB) algorithm measures the optimistic perfor-
mance upper bound of the sampling probabilities.
4.3 Rewards
The F1 score of downstream task model on develop-
ment set is used as reward during policy search. To
discover augmentation policies which are geared
towards improving generalization of RC model, we
calculate the F1 score of task model (trained on
source domain) on out-of-domain or cross-lingual
development datasets, and feed it as the reward to
the optimizer.
4.4 Datasets
We use SQuAD v2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) and
NewsQA (Trischler et al., 2017) for adversarial
evaluation and in-domain policy-search experi-
ments. Futher, we measure generalization from
SQuAD v2.0 to NewsQA, and from SQuAD v1.1
(Rajpurkar et al., 2016) to German dataset from
MLQA (Lewis et al., 2019b) and Russian, Turkish
datasets from XQuAD (Artetxe et al., 2019).4 See
appendix for more details on datasets and training.
4.5 Reading Comprehension Models
We use RoBERTaBASE as the primary RC model
for all our experiments. Search algorithms like
AutoAugment require a downstream model that
can be trained and evaluated fast, in order to re-
duce training time. So, we use distilRoBERTaBASE
(Sanh et al., 2019) for AutoAugment training
loops, which has 40% lesser parameters than
RoBERTaBASE. It should be noted that the distil-
RoBERTa model used in our experiments is trained
on SQuAD without distillation. BayesAugment
is trained for fewer iterations than AutoAugment
and hence, allows us to use RoBERTaBASE model
directly in the training loop. See appendix for base-
line performances of these models on SQuAD and
NewsQA.
4.6 Evaluation Metrics
We use the official SQuAD evaluation script for
evaluation of robustness to adversarial attacks
and performance on in-domain and out-of-domain
4The current choice of cross-lingual RC datasets in our ex-
periments was based on the availability of x-en translation and
span alignment models for the Translate-Test method (Asai
et al., 2018); we are currently actively adding RC datasets in
other languages.
Adversary Method SQuAD NewsQA
Baseline (No Adversaries) 81.17 58.40
AddSentDiverse 65.50 51.47
AddKSentDiverse (K=2) 45.31 48.31
AddAnswerPosition 68.91 49.20
InvalidateAnswer 77.75 24.03
PerturbQuestion 43.67 36.76
PerturbAnswer 71.97 59.08
Effect of Multiple Distractors
AddSentDiverse 65.50 51.47
Add2SentDiverse 45.31 48.31
Add3SentDiverse 43.49 44.81
Combinatorial effect
AddSentDiverse 65.50 51.47
+ PerturbAnswer 50.71 51.43
AddKSentDiverse 45.31 48.31
+ PerturbQuestion 31.56 29.56
Effect of Insert Location of AddAnswerPosition
Random 68.91 49.20
Prepend 66.52 48.01
Append 67.84 48.76
Table 2: Adversarial evaluation of baseline
RoBERTaBASE model trained on SQuAD v2.0
and NewsQA. Compare to corresponding rows in
Table 3 to observe difference in performance after
adversarial training. Results (F1 score) are shown on
dev set.
datasets.5 For cross-lingual evaluation, we use
the modified Translate-Test method as outlined in
Lewis et al. (2019b); Asai et al. (2018). QA sam-
ples in languages other than English are first trans-
lated to English and sent as input to RoBERTaBASE
finetuned on SQuAD v1.1. The predicted answer
spans within English context are then mapped back
to the context in original language using alignment
scores from the translation model. We use the top-
ranked German→English and Russian→English
models in WMT19 shared news translation task,
and train a Turkish→English model using a similar
architecture, to generate translations and alignment
scores (Ng et al., 2019).6
5 Results
First, in Sec. 5.1, we perform adversarial evalua-
tion of baseline RC models for various categories
of adversaries. Next, in Sec. 5.2, we train the RC
models with an augmented dataset that contains
5Statistical significance is computed using bootstrap test
(Noreen, 1989; Tibshirani and Efron, 1993) with 100K sam-
ples.
6Available at https://github.com/pytorch/
fairseq
Adversary Method SQuAD NewsQA
AddSentDiverse 68.00 61.13
AddKSentDiverse (K=2) 79.44 62.31
AddAnswerPosition 80.16 56.90
InvalidateAnswer 91.41 67.57
PerturbQuestion 60.91 44.99
PerturbAnswer 76.42 60.74
Original Dev (No Adversaries) 78.83 58.08
Table 3: Adversarial evaluation after training
RoBERTaBASE with the original dataset augmented
with equally sampled adversarial data. Compare to
corresponding rows in Table 2 to observe difference
in performance after adversarial training. Results (F1
score) are shown on dev set.
equal ratios of adversarial samples and show that
it improves robustness to adversarial attacks but
hurts performance of the model on original unaug-
mented dataset. Finally, in Sec. 5.3, we present
results from AutoAugment and BayesAugment pol-
icy search and the in-domain, out-of-domain and
cross-lingual performance of RC models trained us-
ing augmentation data generated from the learned
policies with corresponding target rewards.
5.1 Adversarial Evaluation
Table 2 shows results from adversarial evaluation
of RoBERTaBASE finetuned with SQuAD v2.0 and
NewsQA respectively. All adversarial methods
lead to a significant drop in performance for the
finetuned models i.e., between 4-45% for both
datasets. The decrease in performance is maximum
when there are multiple distractors in the context
(Add3SentDiverse) or perturbations are combined
with one another (AddSentDiverse + PerturbAn-
swer). These results show that, in spite of being
equipped with a broader understanding of language
from pretraining, the finetuned RC models are shal-
low and over-stabilized to textual patterns like n-
gram overlap. Further, the models aren’t robust to
semantic and syntactic variations in text.
5.2 Manual Adversarial Training
Next, in order to remediate the drop in performance
observed in Table 2 and improve robustness to ad-
versaries, the RC models are further finetuned for
2 epochs with an adversarially augmented train-
ing set. The augmented training set contains each
QA sample from the original training set and a cor-
responding adversarial QA sample by randomly
sampling from one of the perturbation sub-policies.
Table 3 shows results from adversarial evaluation
after adversarial training. Adding perturbed data
during training considerably improves robustness
of the models to adversarial attacks. For instance,
RoBERTaBASE performs with 79.44 F1 score on
SQuAD AddKSentDiverse samples (second row,
Table 3), as compared to 45.31 F1 score without
adversarial training (third row, Table 2). Similarly,
RoBERTaBASE performs with 44.99 F1 score on
NewsQA PerturbQuestion samples (fifth row, Ta-
ble 3), as compared to 36.76 F1 score by the base-
line model (sixth row, Table 2). However, this
manner of adversarial training also leads to drop in
performance on the original unaugmented develop-
ment set, e.g., RoBERTaBASE performs with 78.83
and 58.08 F1 scores on the SQuAD and NewsQA
development sets respectively, which is 2.34 and
0.32 points lesser than the baseline scores (first row,
Table 2).7
5.3 Augmentation Policy Search for Domain
and Language Generalization
Following the conclusion from Sec. 5.2 that
uniform sampling of adversaries is not the opti-
mal approach for model performance on original
unaugmented dataset, we perform automated policy
search over a large search space using BayesAug-
ment and AutoAugment for in-domain as well as
cross-domain/lingual improvements (as discussed
in Sec. 4). For AutoAugment, we choose the num-
ber of sub-policies in a policy to be n = 3 as
a trade-off between search space dimension and
optimum results. We search for the best transfor-
mation policies for the source domain that lead to
improvement of the model in 3 areas: 1. in-domain
performance 2. generalization to other domains
and 3. generalization to other languages. Results
from these experiments are presented in Tables 4
and 5 and the learned policies are shown in Table 6.
In-domain evaluation: The best AutoAugment
augmentation policies for improving in-domain per-
formance of RoBERTaBASE on the development
sets result in 0.46% and 3.77% improvement in F1
score over baseline for SQuAD v2.0 and NewsQA
respectively (see Table 4). Similarly, we observe
0.54% (p=0.021) and 0.22% (p=0.013) absolute im-
provement in F1 Score for SQuAD and NewsQA
respectively by using BayesAugment policies. This
trend is reflected in results on the test set as well.
AutoAugment policies result in most improvement
7We also train RC models on a subset of adversaries and
test on unseen adversaries. See results in Sec. 6.
Search In-domain SQuAD→
Method SQuAD NewsQA NewsQA
Validation
Baseline 81.17 / 77.54 58.40 / 47.04 48.36 / 36.06
AutoAug 81.63 / 78.06 62.17 / 49.41 50.57 / 38.56
BayesAug 81.71 / 78.12 58.62 / 47.21 49.73 / 38.38
Test
Baseline 80.64 / 77.19 57.02 / 45.29 44.95 / 34.68
AutoAug 81.06 / 77.79 59.09 / 45.49 46.82 / 35.75
BayesAug 80.88 / 77.57 57.63 / 45.32 48.95 / 37.44
Table 4: Baseline performance (first row) and eval-
uation after finetuning baseline models with the ad-
versarial policies derived from AutoAugment and
BayesAugment for in-domain improvements and out-
of-domain generalization from Wikipedia (SQuAD) to
news (NewsQA) domain. Results (F1 / Exact Match)
are shown on validation and test sets.
Search Cross-lingual generalization
Method from English SQuAD→
MLQA (de) XQuAD (ru) XQuAD (tr)
Validation
Baseline 58.39 / 36.33 67.80 / 44.56 42.72 / 25.01
BayesAug 59.40 / 37.11 68.73 / 45.34 44.09 / 25.73
Test
Baseline 57.20 / 35.86 60.95 / 33.52 40.10 / 22.98
BayesAug 59.02 / 38.01 63.03 / 34.85 41.95 / 24.17
Table 5: Cross-lingual QA: Translate-Test (Lewis et al.,
2019b) evaluation after finetuning the baseline with ad-
versarial policies derived from BayesAugment for gen-
eralization to German (de), Russian (ru) and Turkish
(tr) RC datasets. Results (F1 / Exact Match) are shown
on validation and test sets.
i.e., 0.42% (p=0.014) and 2.07% (p=0.007) for
SQuAD and NewsQA respectively.
Out-of-domain evaluation: To evaluate gen-
eralization of the RC model from the do-
main of Wikipedia to news articles, we train
RoBERTaBASE on SQuAD and evaluate on
NewsQA. As seen in Table 4, out-of-domain per-
formance for RoBERTaBASE trained on adversari-
ally augmented SQuAD and evaluated on NewsQA
(SQuAD→NewsQA) improves by 2.21% F1 score
on the development set with the best augmen-
tation policy from AutoAugment. The baseline
row presents results of RoBERTaBASE trained on
original unaugmented SQuAD and evaluated on
NewsQA. BayesAugment provides a competitive
and less computationally intensive substitute to
AutoAugment in out-of-domain evaluation with
1.37% improvement over baseline. However, the
trend varies for test set evaluation; BayesAugment
policy for generalization from SQuAD→NewsQA
AutoAugment Policies
SQuAD→ SQuAD (AddS, None, 0.2)→ (IA, None, 0.4)→ (AddA, None, 0.2)
SQuAD→ NewsQA (None, PA, 0.4)→ (None, PA, 0.6)→ (AddS, PA, 0.4)
NewsQA→ NewsQA (AddA, PA, 0.2)→ (AddKS, None, 0.2)→ (AddA, PA, 0.4)
BayesAugment Policies
SQuAD→ SQuAD (AddS, 0.29), (AddA, 0.0), (AddA-PA, 0.0), (AddA-PQ, 0.0), (AddKS, 0.0), (AddKS-PA,0.0)
(AddKS-PQ, 0.0), (AddS-PA, 0.0), (AddS-PQ, 0.0), (PA, 0.61), (PQ, 0.0), (IA, 1.0)
SQuAD→ NewsQA (AddS, 1.0), (AddA, 0.0), (AddA-PA, 1.0), (AddA-PQ, 0.0), (AddKS, 0.0), (AddKS-PA, 0.0)
(AddKS-PQ, 0.0), (AddS-PA, 1.0), (AddS-PQ, 0.0), (PA, 0.48), (PQ, 0.0), (IA, 0.0)
SQuAD→MLQA(de) (AddS, 0.042), (AddA-PA, 0.174), (AddA-PQ, 0.565), (AddKS, 0.173), (AddKS-PA, 0.567)
(AddA, 0.514), (AddS-PA, 0.869), (AddS-PQ, 0.720), (PA, 0.903), (PQ, 0.278), (AddKS-PQ, 0.219)
SQuAD→ XQuAD(ru) (AddS, 0.147), (AddA-PA, 0.174), (AddA-PQ, 0.79), (AddKS, 0.55), (AddKS-PA, 0.97)
(AddA, 0.77), (AddS-PA, 0.02), (AddS-PQ, 0.59), (PA, 0.11), (PQ, 0.95), (AddKS-PQ, 0.725)
SQuAD→ XQuAD(tr) (AddS, 0.091), (AddA-PA, 0.463), (AddA-PQ, 0.64), (AddKS, 0.32), (AddKS-PA, 0.86)
(AddA, 0.34), (AddS-PA, 0.37), (AddS-PQ, 0.43), (PA, 0.27), (PQ, 0.81), (AddKS-PQ, 0.493)
NewsQA→ NewsQA (AddS, 1.0), (AddA, 1.0), (AddA-PA, 1.0), (AddA-PQ, 0.0), (AddKS, 0.0), (AddKS-PA, 1.0)
(AddKS-PQ, 0.156), (AddS-PA, 0.0), (AddS-PQ, 0.720), (PA, 0.0), (PQ, 0.0), (IA, 1.0)
Table 6: Best Policies suggested by BayesAugment and AutoAugment methods for different scenarios; AddS =
AddSentDiverse, AddKS = AddKSentDiverse, AddA = AddAnswerPosition, IA = InvalidateAnswer, PA = Pertur-
bAnswer, PQ = PerturbQuestion.
results in 4% (p<0.001) improvement on the test
set while AutoAugment improves F1 by 1.87%
(p=0.004).
Our experiments suggest that AutoAugment
finds better policies than BayesAugment for in-
domain evaluation. We hypothesize that this might
be attributed to a difference in search space be-
tween the two policy search methods. AutoAug-
ment is restricted to sampling at most 3 sub-policies
while BayesAugment has to simultaneously opti-
mize the transformation probability for ten or more
different augmentation methods. A diverse mix of
adversaries from the latter is shown to be benefi-
cial for out-of-domain generalization but results in
minor improvements for in-domain performance.
Moving ahead, due to better performance for out-
of-domain evaluation and more efficient trade-off
with computation, we only use BayesAugment for
our cross-lingual experiments.
Cross-lingual evaluation: Table 5 shows re-
sults of RoBERTaBASE finetuned with adversar-
ially augmented SQuAD v1.1 and evaluated on
RC datasets in languages other than English. The
baseline row presents results from RoBERTaBASE
trained on original unaugmented SQuAD and eval-
uated on German MLQA(de), Russian XQuAD(ru)
and Turkish XQuAD(tr) datasets; F1 scores on the
development sets are 58.39, 67.80 and 42.72 re-
spectively. It should be noted that these scores
depend on quality of the translation model as well
as the reading comprehension model. We observe
significant improvements on the development as
well as test sets without the use of additional train-
ing data in target language i.e only by finetuning
baseline RC model with adversarial data from En-
glish SQuAD. BayesAugment policies result in
1.82% (p<0.001), 2.08% (p=0.009) and 1.85%
(p=0.013) improvement for test sets of MLQA(de),
XQuAD(ru) and XQuAD(tr), respectively.
6 Analysis and Discussion
Having established the efficacy of automated pol-
icy search for adversarial training, we further probe
the robustness of models to adversarial attacks to
analyze its dependence on source domain. Next,
we train RoBERTaBASE on a subset of adversaries
and evaluate its robustness to unseen adversaries.
We also show the impact of adversarial augmenta-
tion ratio in training dataset and the size of training
dataset on the generalization of RC model to out-of-
domain data. Lastly, we analyze the convergence of
BayesAugment for adversarial augmentation pol-
icy search and contrast its requirement of computa-
tional resources with that of AutoAugment.
Domain-Independence of Robustness to Ad-
versarial Attacks: We have shown that a read-
NewsQA Adversary SQuAD SQuAD→
NewsQA
AddSentDiverse 42.39 / 32.79 49.54 / 38.02
PerturbAnswer 39.95 / 27.60 45.52 / 32.49
AddSentDiv-PertrbAns 35.08 / 26.33 43.63 / 32.76
Table 7: Comparison of robustness between
RoBERTaBASE finetuned on original unaugmented
SQuAD and our best SQuAD→ NewsQA generalized
model (see Sec. 5.3). The latter is more robust to
adversarial NewsQA without being trained on any
NewsQA samples. Results (F1 score/Exact Match) are
shown on dev set.
ing comprehension model trained on SQuAD
can be generalized to NewsQA by finetuning the
model with adversarially transformed samples from
SQuAD dataset. It is expected that this model will
be robust to similar attacks on SQuAD. To assess if
this robustness generalizes to NewsQA as well, we
evaluate our best SQuAD→NewsQA model on ad-
versarially transformed NewsQA samples from the
development set. The SQuAD column in Table 7
shows results from evaluation of RoBERTaBASE
finetuned with original unaugmented SQuAD, on
adversarially transformed NewsQA samples. The
rightmost column shows results from similar eval-
uation of the SQuAD→NewsQA model that has
been trained using the BayesAugment adversar-
ial augmentation policy for generalization from
SQuAD to NewsQA. Interestingly, the generalized
model is 5-8% more robust to adversarial NewsQA
without being trained on any NewsQA samples,
showing that robustness to adversarial attacks in
source domain easily generalizes to adversarial at-
tacks in a different domain.
Robustness to Unseen Adversaries: We train
RoBERTaBASE on a subset of adversarial attacks
and evaluate it on the adversaries that were not in
the training set, to analyze robustness of the model
to unseen adversaries. In the first set of experi-
ments, we train RoBERTaBASE on SQuAD v2.0
augmented with the AddSentDiverse counterpart
of each original QA sample. In the second set of
experiments, we train RoBERTaBASE on SQuAD
which has been augmented with an adversarial
dataset of the same size as SQuAD and contains
equal number of samples from AddSentDiverse,
PerturbQuestion and PerturbAnswer. As seen from
the results in Table 8, training with AddSentDi-
verse leads to large improvements on AddKSent-
Diverse and small improvements on PerturbQues-
tion and PerturbAnswer i.e., 31.21% (45.31 vs.
Trained on Trained on
Adversary Attack SQuAD SQ+ASD
AddKSentDiverse 45.31 76.52
InvalidateAnswer 77.75 70.91
PerturbQuestion 43.67 45.23
PerturbAnswer 71.97 77.28
Trained on Trained on
Adversary Attack SQuAD SQ+ASD/PQ/PA
AddSentDiverse+PerturbAnswer 50.71 84.37
AddKSentDiverse+PerturbQuestion 31.56 78.91
AddAnswerPosition 68.91 80.87
AddKSentDiverse 45.31 76.14
InvalidateAnswer 77.75 71.62
Table 8: Robustness of RoBERTaBASE trained
on a subset of adversaries to unseen adversaries.
Results (F1 score) are shown on SQuAD dev
set (ASD=AddSentDiverse, PQ=PerturbQuestion,
PA=PerturbAnswer, SQ=SQuAD).
Augmentation Ratio NewsQA
RoBERTa 48.36 / 36.06
+ 1x augmentation 49.73 / 38.38
+ 2x augmentation 49.84 / 37.97
+ 3x augmentation 49.62 / 38.01
Table 9: Effect of augmentation ratio for generaliza-
tion from SQuAD→NewsQA. Results (F1 score/Exact
Match) are shown on NewsQA dev set.
76.52), 1.56% (43.67 vs. 45.23) and 5.31% (71.97
vs. 77.28) respectively, showing that the model is
significantly robust to multiple distractors within
the same context and it also gains some resilience
to paraphrasing operations. Conversely, we see a
drop in performance on InvalidateAnswer, showing
that it is easier for the model to be distracted by
adversaries when the original answer is removed
from the context. In the second set of experiments,
we see that the model is significantly more ro-
bust to combinatorial adversaries like AddSentDi-
verse+PerturbAnswer when trained on the adver-
saries AddSentDiverse and PerturbAnswer individ-
ually. We also see a decline in performance on
InvalidateAnswer.
Effect of Augmentation Ratio: To assess
the importance of adversarial augmentation in
the dataset, we experimented with different ra-
tios i.e., 1x, 2x and 3x, of augmented samples
to the original dataset, for generalization from
SQuAD to NewsQA using the augmentation pol-
icy learnt by BayesAugment. The performance of
SQuAD→NewsQA models on NewsQA validation
set were 49.73, 49.84 and 49.62 for 1x, 2x and
3x augmentations respectively, showing slight im-
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Figure 2: Performance of SQuAD→ NewsQA model
on NewsQA dev set (F1 score) with increasing size of
finetuning dataset.
provement for twice the number of augmentations.
However, the performance starts decreasing at 3x
augmentations, showing that too many adversaries
in the training data starts hurting generalization.
Effect of Augmented Dataset Size: We exper-
imented with 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% of
the original dataset to generate augmented dataset
using the BayesAugment policy for generalization
of RoBERTaBASE trained on SQuAD to NewsQA
and observed little variance in performance with in-
creasing data, as seen from Figure 2. The augmen-
tation ratio in these datasets is 1:1. We hypothesize
that the model is saturated early on during training,
within the first tens of thousands of adversarially
augmented samples. Exposing the model to more
SQuAD samples gives little boost to performance
on NewsQA thereafter.
Bayesian Convergence: In comparison to the
thousands of training loops or more for AutoAug-
ment, we run BayesAugment for only 100 training
loops with 20 restarts. To show that BayesAugment
converges within the given period, we plot the dis-
tance between transformation probabilities chosen
by the Bayesian optimizer for the AddSentDiverse-
PerturbQuestion augmentation method. As shown
in Figure 3, the distance between the samples de-
creases as the training iterations increase, showing
that the optimizer becomes more confident about
the narrow range of probability which should be
sampled for maximum performance on validation
set.
Analysis of Resources for AutoAugment vs
BayesAugment: With lesser number of training
loops, BayesAugment uses only 10% of the GPU
resources required for AutoAugment. Our Au-
toAugment experiments have taken more than 1000
iterations and upto 5-6 days for convergence, requir-
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Figure 3: Demonstration of variation in distance be-
tween neighboring samples picked by Bayesian opti-
mizer with increasing training iterations. The red line
represents moving average of distances.
ing many additional days for hyperparameter tun-
ing. In contrast, our BayesAugment experiment ran
for 36-48 hours on 2 1080Ti GPUs and achieved
comparable performance with 100 iterations or less.
If large pretrained models are replaced with smaller
distilled models in future work, BayesAugment
will provide even more gains in time/computation.
7 Conclusion
We show that adversarial training can be leveraged
to improve robustness of reading comprehension
models to adversarial attacks and also to improve
performance on source domain and generaliza-
tion to out-of-domain and cross-lingual data. We
present BayesAugment for policy search, which
achieves results similar to the computationally-
intensive AutoAugment method but with a frac-
tion of computational resources. By combining
policy search with rewards from the correspond-
ing target development sets’ performance, we show
that models trained on SQuAD can be generalized
to NewsQA and German, Russian, Turkish cross-
lingual datasets without any training data from the
target domain or language.
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A Appendices
A.1 Adversary Attacks
PerturbAnswer (Semantic Paraphrasing): Fol-
lowing Alzantot et al. (2018), we perform semantic
paraphrasing of the sentence containing the answer
span. Instead of using genetic algorithm, we adapt
their Perturb subroutine to generate paraphrases
in the following steps:
1. Select word locations for perturbations, which
includes locations within any content phrase
that does not appear within the answer span.
Here, content phrases are verbs, adverbs and
adjectives.
2. For location ki in the set of word locations {k},
compute 20 nearest neighbors of the word at
given location using GloVe embeddings, create
a candidate sentence by perturbing the word lo-
cation with each of the substitute words and rank
perturbed sentences using a language model.
3. Select the perturbed sentence with highest rank
and perform Step 2 for the next location ki+1
using the perturbed sentence.
We use the OpenAI-GPT model (Radford et al.,
2018) to evaluate paraphrases.
A.2 Datasets
SQuAD v2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) is a crowd-
sourced dataset consisting of 100,000 questions
from SQuAD v1.1 (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) and
an additional 50,000 questions that do not have
answers within the given context. We split the
official development set into 2 randomly sampled
sets of validation and test for our experiments.
NewsQA is also a crowd-sourced extractive RC
dataset based on 10,000 news articles from CNN,
containing both answerable and unanswerable ques-
tions. (Trischler et al., 2017) To accommodate
very long contexts from NewsQA in models like
Bert (Devlin et al., 2019) and RoBERTa (Liu et al.,
2019), we sample two instances from the set of
overlapping instances for the final training data.
MLQA (Lewis et al., 2019b) is the multilingual
extension to SQuAD v1.1 consisting of evaluation
(development and test) data only. We use German
(de) MLQA in our experiments.
XQuAD is a multilingual version of SQuAD
(Artetxe et al., 2019) containing only test sets. We
use Russian (ru) and Turkish (tr) XQuAD which
contain nearly 1100 QA samples that are further
split equally and randomly into development and
test sets.
Model SQuADv1.1 SQuADv2.0 NewsQA
RoBERTa 89.73 / 82.38 81.17 / 77.54 58.40 / 47.04
DistilRoBERTa 84.57 / 75.81 73.29 / 69.47 54.21 / 42.76
Table 10: Comparison of performance (F1 Score / Ex-
act Match) of different models on SQuAD v1.1, SQuaD
v2.0 and NewsQA datasets. RoBERTaBASE is the base-
line model; DistilRoBERTaBASE is the task model used
during AutoAugment policy search.
Hyperparameter SQuAD v1.1 SQuAD v2.0 NewsQA
Learning Rate 3e-5 1.5e-5 1.6e-5
Batch Size 24 16 24
Warmup Ratio 0.06 0.06 0.08
No. of Epochs 2 5 5
Weight Decay 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 11: Best hyperparameters for training
RoBERTaBASE on SQuAD v2.0 and NewsQA.
A.3 Training Details
Model Hyperparameters: We trained
RoBERTaBASE for 5 epochs on SQuAD and
NewsQA respectively and selected the best-
performing checkpoint as baseline. We perform
a hyperparameter search for both datasets using
Bayesian optimization search (Snoek et al., 2012).
The RNN controller in AutoAugment training loop
consists of a single LSTM cell with a single hidden
layer and hidden layer dimension of 100. The
generated policy consists of 3 sub-policies; each
sub-policy is structured as represented in Figure 1
in main text. BayesAugment is trained for 100
iterations with 20 restarts. During AutoAugment
and BayesAugment training loops, RoBERTaBASE
or distilRoBERTaBASE (which has already been
trained on unaugmented SQuAD) is further
finetuned on the adversarially augmented dataset
for 2 epochs with a warmup ratio of 0.2 and
learning rate decay (lr=1e-5) thereafter. After the
policy search, further hyperparameter optimization
is performed for best results from fine-tuning. We
do not perform this last step of hyperparameter
tuning on cross-lingual data to avoid the risk of
overfitting the small datasets. For generalization
from SQuAD v1.1 to cross-lingual datasets, we
do not consider the adversary InvalidateAnswer
because NoAnswer samples do not exist for these
datasets.
